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Abstract
Optimistic beliefs affect important areas of economic decision making, yet direct
knowledge on how belief biases operate remains limited. To better understand these
biases I conduct an experiment examining beliefs about binary events with financial
stakes. By varying financial prizes in outcomes, as well as incentive payments for accu-
racy, the experiment is able to distinguish between two leading theories of optimistic
belief formation that differ in their assumptions about how such beliefs are constrained.
The optimal expectations theory of Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) models beliefs as
being constrained through the future costs of holding incorrect beliefs, while the af-
fective decision making model of Bracha and Brown (2012) argues that beliefs are
constrained by mental costs of distorting reality. The results suggest that people hold
optimistically biased beliefs, and comparative statics indicate that these beliefs are not
constrained by increasing the costs of making inaccurate judgments. In fact, the results
support the theory of Bracha and Brown (2012), as observed bias is increasing in the
size of incentive payments for accuracy.
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1 Introduction
Optimistic beliefs play an important role in decision making, yet a lack of direct evidence
hinders the ability of researchers to model these biases. Accurately modeling optimism is
critical for developing theory and informing policy. Beliefs affect decisions such as saving for
retirement, starting a new business, or investing in the stock market.1 This has motivated
theorists to challenge the benchmark rational model of decision making under uncertainty.
While substantial theoretical progress has been made, rigorous tests of existing theory and
direct evidence about optimism are scarce.2 The contribution of this paper is to provide
this direct evidence, and distinguish between two leading ways to model optimism.
Early thinkers such as Bentham (1789) discussed the pleasures associated with holding
positive expectations about the future. Contemporary theories of optimism have incor-
porated the idea that individuals get utility from anticipation of the future. Akerlof and
Dickens (1982) implicitly use this framework in their model of cognitive dissonance when
they consider the benefits to workers of having reduced fear about the probability of an
accident at the workplace. There must also be costs to holding optimistic beliefs, as ex-
perience suggests people do not always hold extreme beliefs. In contrast to the relative
consensus regarding the benefits of optimism, there is disagreement in theory over how the
costs should be modeled.
Two approaches have been taken in the literature to model the costs of holding op-
timistic beliefs. First, holding distorted beliefs may lead an individual to make worse
decisions. This approach is taken by Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) (henceforth BP):
optimal expectations trade off the anticipatory benefits of optimism with the costs of worse
decision making. Here optimal beliefs are not directly constrained by reality. In contrast,
the second approach is to model a direct cost of distorting reality. As individual optimism
strays further from the “truth”, it becomes increasingly costly to internally justify holding
these beliefs. In the theory of affective decision making, Bracha and Brown (2012) (hence-
forth BB) model a strategic game between an emotional process and a rational process,
that emphasizes these direct costs of distorting reality.
To illustrate the difference between the two approaches, consider the topic of Oster et al.
1Evidence that optimistic beliefs play a role in these situations can be found in Puri and Robinson
(2007), Landier and Thesmar (2009), and Easterwood and Nutt (1999) respectively.
2Within psychology, there exist some direct experimental tests of optimism, however participants in
these experiments are typically not provided financial incentives for accurate responses, and these studies
are often not designed with the aim of distinguishing or testing theory. See for example Vosgerau (2010).
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(2013), who study the beliefs of patients at risk for Huntington Disease (HD), a degenerative
neurological disorder that significantly reduces life expectancy.3 Using a time series of
objective risk status as well as subjective risk perceptions, they find that individuals are
optimistic about their risk of having HD and subsequently are less likely to be tested for
the disease. Patterns in the data are not consistent with a standard rational model, but
are consistent with the optimal expectations model of BP.4
According to the BP model, the costs of holding optimistic beliefs are the consequences
of high risk individuals making uninformed life decisions, i.e. behaving as if they were
low risk. These costs are, subconsciously, weighed against the benefits, determining the
optimal level of bias. On the other hand, in BB, as an individual becomes more and more
optimistic about his risk status for HD, his beliefs are stretched further from reality. In
determining the optimal belief, it becomes harder for the individual to believe he is of very
low risk, e.g. in face of evidence from doctors who are telling him he is at high risk for
HD.5
The differences in how BB and BP model the costs of holding optimistically biased
beliefs lead to very different policy prescriptions for de-biasing individuals. The model of
BP argues that the only way to reduce optimism bias is by altering the consequences of
actions taken while holding distorted beliefs. The BB model is suggestive that information
campaigns that raise the costs of distorting reality have the potential to be effective. In
the case of HD, the model of BP implies that forcing high risk individuals to confront their
risk status will not affect testing rates, whereas in BB this will increase the direct costs of
distorting beliefs, leading to higher testing rates.6
This paper distinguishes between these two models by eliciting beliefs of individuals
about binary events in which they have a financial stake. The elicitation procedure in-
duces truthful reporting of beliefs for individuals, regardless of whether they are standard
Rational Expectations (RE) agents, BP agents, or BB agents. Individuals are given an
3The average age of onset of HD is 40.
4Oster et al. (2013) also provide evidence that other models of belief bias such as the information aversion
model of Koszegi (2003) do not fit the patterns in the data. It is worth emphasizing, while they do not
consider the model of Bracha and Brown (2012), it is also consistent with the patterns in the data.
5A subtle but important note is that in both models the optimizing cost benefit analysis is not the
outcome of a conscious decision, but occurs at a subconscious level. If one is aware of the self deception,
this would work to eliminate any benefits from optimism in the first place.
6This statement is only true when such information campaigns contain no new information that might
be incorporated into beliefs in both models. In this sense the idea is similar to using graphic images of car
crashes to prevent teenage drunk driving.
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income stake in an event, and must report the probability this event occurs. The two
comparative statics involve varying the level of income, and varying the incentive payment
for accurate reporting. The elicitation procedure follows the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
(BDM) method applied to lotteries, henceforth referred to as the lottery method, which
is attractive for two key reasons. First, the procedure is incentive compatible for any risk
preferences7, and second, it theoretically generates opposite comparative static predictions
for the two models of interest.8 Increasing the income stake exacerbates optimism bias in
both BP and BB models, which is unsurprising as both model the benefits to optimism
similarly. However, increasing the incentive payment for accuracy results in a lower bias
for BP agents, but a higher bias for BB agents.
To preview the intuition for this result, in BB, increasing incentive payments does not
alter the costs of distorting reality, but affects anticipatory benefits as expected payoffs
in the experiment increase. In BP, the cost of making worse decisions is precisely the
loss in expected payment from reporting a biased belief, which dominates any anticipatory
benefits.
Finally, as a qualitative test of the predictions of BB, I examine probability reports
across different domains. Two events involve a random process that is “objective”, in the
sense that there exists consensus that baseline probabilities exist and can be calculated.9
The events differ in how cognitively demanding it is to determine the baseline probability.
The other two events do not have obvious baseline probabilities that can be calculated, and
may depend on subject ability. BB make the qualitative prediction that as events become
less objective, costs of distortion will change, while BP predict no change in the costs of
distortion, and thus no change in the degree of bias.
To preview the results, I find evidence of optimistic beliefs across all domains and
treatments. Giving subjects a large financial stake in an event leads to an increase in bias,
consistent with both models. I also find that giving subjects larger incentive payments
for accurate reports leads to an increase in optimism bias, a prediction made uniquely by
the model of BB. BP make a somewhat more intuitive, but opposite prediction that larger
7The method used in this experiment has a dominant strategy equilibrium of truth-telling that does
not require the assumption of Expected Utility (EU) (see Karni (2009)). This is not to be confused with
using the BDM method to elicit willingness-to-pay for a lottery, where incentive compatibility necessarily
requires the assumption of EU (see Karni et al. (1987) or Horowitz (2006)).
8Other elicitation procedures, such as the quadratic scoring rule (QSR) require the assumption of risk
neutrality, but further, do not generate opposite comparative static predictions necessary for this study.
9I am not aware of a rigorous definition of objective in this context. One can see Gilboa and Schmeidler
(2001) for a definition, which agrees with the characterization in this paper.
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incentive payments for accuracy will lead to less bias, which is rejected in the data. Also
consistent with BB, is that, qualitatively, the degree of bias is increasing as the random
process that determines events become less objective.10
The next section outlines related literature and experimental evidence of optimism in
psychology and economics. I then introduce the experiment in the form of a stylized model
and derive the theoretical comparative static results outlined above. I next discuss the
experimental design, followed by results, and a concluding discussion.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Experimental
There are a number of experiments testing or seeking to understand models of belief bias,
often in the realm of overconfidence. Such models are related in the sense that they assume
individuals benefit from holding positive views about their self-image or ability, compared
with models of optimism that assume benefits to holding positive views about the future.11
There are a number of situations where overconfidence and optimism overlap, for example
the prospect of getting a future salary increase may be a signal of high ability that also is
a direct increase in income.
In many experiments on overconfidence, the focus is not only on prior beliefs, but also
on how subjects update their beliefs about personal qualities such as intelligence. These
experiments are motivated by models of biased information seeking, and/or biased infor-
mation processing. Some evidence that individuals might overweight positive information
is found in studies by Mobius et al. (2014) and Eil and Rao (2011).12 Both papers also find
a positive relationship between seeking information about ability when such information is
likely to confirm prior beliefs.
In contrast to experiments that examine overconfidence, Mayraz (2014) examines beliefs
over outcomes and finds some evidence of optimistic beliefs in a novel experiment where
sessions were divided into “farmers” and “bakers” and income depends on a hypothetical
10This statement of course is not directly testable, as I do not have a rigorous definition of the objectivity
of a random process.
11Models of overconfidence include Benabou and Tirole (2002) and Ko¨szegi (2006) among others.
12There are studies that do not find such asymmetries in updating, for example Grossman and Owens
(2012) finds no such pattern (however they look at absolute rather than relative performance), while Ertac
(2011) actually finds the opposite pattern. In a companion paper, Coutts (2015) finds no evidence of biased
information processing.
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price of wheat. While the motivation is most similar to this paper, in the current experiment
I use an incentive compatible elicitation procedure with no opportunities for hedging.
Additionally I ensure that randomization of the primary treatment is at the individual
level, ensuring subjects’ earning expectations are invariant to the treatment.13 Further,
the experiment of this paper maintains a close connection to theoretical work on optimism
bias, which will lay the groundwork for the design and interpretation of results.
2.2 Theoretical
For most theoretical work on optimism bias, individuals benefit from holding optimistic
beliefs as they derive utility from anticipation of the future.14 Akerlof and Dickens (1982)
was one of the earliest models to motivate such beliefs in economics, describing the decision
of a worker to choose, incorrectly, to believe that the probability of an accident in his
workplace is low.15 Loewenstein (1987) explicitly outlined a model of anticipatory benefits
to consumption, theorizing that this could explain why individuals might optimally delay
consumption.
The idea that individuals might get utility from anticipation was further explored by
Caplin and Leahy (2001) who modeled choice behavior in such a world, as well as Landier
(2000) who introduced a model where anticipatory feelings were nurtured through a biased
information process.16 A more recent model similar in spirit to Landier (2000) is found in
Mayraz (2014). In his Priors and Desires model, individuals bias perceived probabilities of
various states proportional to the relative attractiveness of the states. Increasing payoffs
in a given state increases the bias, while there are no costs associated with optimism in the
model.17
13A design concern is that if subjects have earnings expectations for their time in the lab, they can back
out moments of the distribution of a random event, and this can generate beliefs that appear optimistic.
In Section 4 I explain how I overcome this potential confound.
14Other models of belief bias are related including models of biased memory, biased information seeking,
or other benefits to ego-preserving beliefs, such as motivation or social signalling, as described in Benabou
and Tirole (2002). In the experiment, there is no memory component and the structure of receiving
information is exogenous. Additionally the treatment parameters are given exogenously, and not related to
personal qualities.
15Specifically, there are psychological costs of fear increasing in the probability an accident will occur.
Here, anticipation is over losses, and hence there are anticipatory benefits to believing such states are less
likely.
16Related is Koszegi (2010) who modeled an individual optimizing simultaneously beliefs and behavior,
defining a personal equilibrium concept.
17Formally the model is agnostic over whether individuals are optimistic, realist (rational), or pessimistic.
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Most relevant are the two key theories of this experiment, those of Brunnermeier and
Parker (2005) (BP) and Bracha and Brown (2012) (BB). The next section describes these
theories in detail.18
3 Theory
In this section I summarize two different theories of biased beliefs that generate differ-
ent, testable predictions in the experiment. Next, I will describe the experiment, in the
form of a stylized model, and discuss implications for the two theories. The final task
is to characterize optimal beliefs under each of these models and summarize the relevant
comparative statics that distinguish the two theories from each other, and from standard
rational expectations (RE).
3.1 Summary of Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) (BP)
In the optimal expectations framework of BP, the key tradeoff is between the anticipatory
benefits agents receive from holding optimistic beliefs and the costs of these beliefs due to
worse decision-making. I consider a two period model with consumption occurring only
in the second period, an identical setting to the stylized model I will introduce in Section
3.3.19
The first period involves individuals choosing an action that only affects second period
consumption.20 Utility is given by u(·), an increasing, twice differentiable function that is
independent of time. There are a finite number of n states S ≡ {s1, ..., sn} with state sj
occurring with objective probability pij . Consumption in state sj is given by cj . Denote pˆij
as the subjective probability an individual assigns to state sj .
18A large literature exists examining the theory of decisions under uncertainty/ambiguity. An entry level
overview can be found in Etner et al. (2012). Bracha and Brown (2012) provide an axiomatic characteriza-
tion of their model, showing that an alternative interpretation of the model is that it captures ambiguity
seeking behavior. In particular the model is identical to the variational preferences model of Maccheroni et
al. (2006) (MMR), when Axiom A.5 (uncertainty aversion) is replaced with uncertainty seeking. The differ-
ence in attitudes towards uncertainty/ambiguity may arise from differences in source: in BB the ambiguity
is endogenous, in MMR it is exogenous.
19BP additionally allow a role for memory, where individuals may retrospectively gain utility by remem-
bering past consumption. When there are only two periods and consumption only occurs in the second
period, memory plays no role in well-being.
20This setup is identical to the Portfolio Choice example presented by BP Section II. They include a
discount factor β but it does not affect the decision problem, so I omit it in the present exercise.
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The agent behaves as if he were a standard expected utility maximizer, but facing
subjective probabilities {pˆi}21 rather than the objective probabilities RE agents are assumed
to face, {pi}. In particular, the agent solves the following optimization problem, choosing
a vector of actions x, where gj(x) is a mapping from actions to state specific consumption.
The agent makes choices in period 1, but does not consume until period 2.
max
x
∑
sj∈S
pˆij · u
(
cj
)
(1)
s.t. cj = gj(x) ∀j
The optimal solution to this problem is x∗({pˆi}), which leads to consumption in each
state, c∗j ({pˆi}). This gives optimal consumption in every state, given probabilities {pˆi}.
Thus far, the individual is a standard expected utility maximizer given optimal beliefs:
{pˆi}.
I now turn to the fundamental component of the BP model, the selection of these
optimal beliefs, {pˆi}. Total welfare is a weighted average of anticipation given beliefs in
the first period, and actual consumption in the second period. To avoid degenerate beliefs,
I follow Oster et al. (2013), Spiegler (2008)22, and Bridet and Schwardmann (2014), and
allow for the possibility that utility from anticipation is lower than utility from actual
consumption.23 Mathematically, I introduce a degree of anticipation parameter γ ∈ [0, 1].
γ = 1 is the modeling assumption in BP, while lower levels of γ correspond to lower benefits
to optimism, with γ = 0 representing a benchmark RE agent.
Given optimal consumption from Equation 1 above, utility from anticipation in the
first period is:
21I use the notation {pˆi} to represent the n× 1 vector of probabilities {pˆi1, ..., pˆin}.
22Spiegler (2008) similarly nest BP as a special case of weighting anticipation by α and consumption by
1−α. He shows that more generally there exists α∗ such that beliefs are degenerate. In many applications
when the costs of holding extreme beliefs is not negative and large in absolute value, α∗ ≤ 1
2
.
23That is, I allow for the intuitive possibility that today, the thought of consuming a pizza tomorrow
(measured today) gives me a lower amount of pleasure than what I get from actually eating the pizza
tomorrow (measured tomorrow).
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γ ·
∑
sj∈S
pˆij · u
(
c∗j ({pˆi})
)
(2)
In the second time period utility is actual consumption, which occurs with the objective
probabilities {pi}:
∑
sj∈S
pij · u
(
c∗j ({pˆi})
)
(3)
Optimal expectations are those that maximize the time average of lifetime utility, sub-
ject to satisfying standard laws of probability.24 Here this is the average of anticipation
in the first period and actual consumption in the second period. Substituting in optimal
consumption (as a function of beliefs) c∗j ({pˆi}), optimal expectations, {pˆi}, are the solution
to the maximization problem:
max
{pˆi}
1
2
· γ ·
∑
sj∈S
pˆij · u
(
c∗j ({pˆi})
)
+
1
2
·
∑
sj∈S
pij · u
(
c∗j ({pˆi})
)
(4)
subject to (i)
n∑
j=1
pˆij = 1, (ii) pˆij ≥ 0, and (iv) pˆij = 0 if pij = 0
Note that these subjective expectations are chosen once and only once. In a multi-
period model this is equivalent to an agent being endowed with optimal priors, and using
Bayes’ rule to update beliefs over time.
Looking at Equation 4, setting γ = 0 eliminates all benefits to holding biased beliefs.
The solution is {pˆi} = {pi}, i.e. the standard beliefs of an RE agent.
3.2 Summary of Bracha and Brown (2012) (BB)
In this model, choice and beliefs are determined simultaneously by the outcome of an
intrapersonal game between two cognitive processes, a rational and an emotional process.
The key difference between the models of BB and BP are the constraints on optimistic
24In particular, from BP: (i)
∑n
j=1 pˆij = 1 (ii) pˆij ≥ 0 for all j and (iv) pˆij = 0 if pij = 0. Note the last
assumption means that individuals cannot assign positive subjective probability to zero probability events.
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Figure 1: Mental Cost Function
Sample mental cost function, J∗(·), of holding distorted beliefs, pˆi, in BB model for two
states. pi is the true probability of one of the states.
beliefs. In BB a mental cost function J∗({pˆi}) constrains beliefs for the emotional process,
whereas in BP it is solely the costly decision errors that result from holding biased beliefs.25
I maintain the same setup as in the earlier section, in particular the same utility function
u(·) and n states, sj ∈ S, with pij the objective probability of state sj . The emotional
process chooses a subjective probability vector {pˆi} that maximizes the following, which
takes choices by the rational process x, and consequently cj as given.
26
max
{pˆi}
∑
sj∈S
pˆij · u
(
cj
)− J∗({pˆi}) (5)
J∗({pˆi}) is a function of Legendre-type: strictly convex, essentially smooth function on
the interior of the probability simplex ∆.27 The function reaches a minimum at {pˆi} = {pi},
and is such that in the limit as pˆij goes to either 0 or 1 (for any pij ∈ (0, 1)), J∗({pˆi})
approaches infinity at a higher rate than the utility function, guaranteeing that holding
extreme beliefs is never optimal. An example of the two state case can be seen in Figure
25The consequences of making worse decisions also factor into the BB model, through the interaction
between the rational and the emotional process.
26In BP optimal beliefs are chosen under the assumption that the agent makes choices after being endowed
with these beliefs. Here by contrast, beliefs and choices are simultaneously chosen.
27For more details, see Bracha and Brown (2012).
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1.
The intuition for such a cost function is based on evidence from the psychology lit-
erature, that people use mental strategies such as biased search to justify their beliefs.
As desired beliefs are further away from the “truth” search costs to support these beliefs
become greater.
The rational process maximizes expected utility given beliefs {pˆi}, which is identical
to Equation 1 in the summary of the BP model in the previous section. Note that un-
like the BP model, the rational process does not observe beliefs, as they are determined
simultaneously by the intrapersonal game.
max
x
∑
sj∈S
pˆij · u
(
cj
)
s.t. cj = gj(x) ∀j
Each of these two payoff functions determine the best response functions. The inter-
section of the best response functions are the Nash equilibria of the game. BB show that
there are an odd number of locally unique pure strategy Nash equilibria.
3.3 Theoretical Predictions
I now outline a stylized model of the experiment and later will characterize optimal behavior
for the three types of agents: BP, BB, and the benchmark RE. There is a binary event of
interest, E which occurs with true probability pi ∈ (0, 1) or does not occur with probability
1 − pi. First nature determines whether E occurs, next an agent is asked to report a
probability p˜i that event E occurs, critically having no information about the occurrence
of E.28 p˜i corresponds to action x in the previous section.
Payoffs are determined in the following way, which is described in Figure 2. In order to
ensure that agents do not wish to hedge their probability reports, the world is partitioned
into two disjoint states, the accuracy state and the prize state.29 With probability  ∈ (0, 1)
28The reason that outcomes are determined before agents give probability reports is to maintain con-
sistency with a secondary component of the experiment that involved updating, given signals. Providing
signals required that these outcomes were known in advance.
29Hedging will be present whenever utility is not linear, for example with a concave utility function and
a positive stake in an event an individual would prefer to report a lower than truthful p˜i, since this will
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Figure 2: Timing of Stylized Model
pi 1− pi
{0, a}∗

P + a¯
1− 
{0, a}∗

a¯
1− 
Nature E
Report p˜i
t = 0
t = 1
t = 2
*In the accuracy state the payoff is either 0 or a, depending on the
reported belief p˜i and whether E occurred, according to the lottery method.
Nature determines outcome of binary event E. Individual submits report p˜i without know-
ing outcome of E, and payoff is determined according to the lottery method elicitation
procedure.
the individual is paid solely according to her reported belief p˜i about whether event E
occurred using the incentive compatible lottery method to elicit beliefs with an accuracy
payment of a > 0 (accuracy state).30
In the second state occurring with probability 1−, the individual receives a guaranteed
payment a¯ ≥ a31 and receives an additional P ≥ 0 if E occurs, but receives nothing extra
if E does not occur (prize state). Her report of p˜i is no longer relevant in this prize state.
The lottery method is incentive compatible even for non-risk neutral agents32, and is
implemented as follows. The individual is asked to submit a report p˜i, the probability that
event E is realized. A random number r is drawn from any distribution with full support
smooth consumption over the different states of the world. Karni and Safra (1995) show that without this
partition, no elicitation procedure exists that induces truthful reporting, a fact that is sometimes overlooked
in the experimental literature; see Armantier and Treich (2013).
30To be clear, two types of hedging are of concern in this experiment. The first is hedging across accuracy
and prize states, which is solved through partitioning. The second is hedging within the accuracy state,
which is solved through use of the lottery method.
31The payment of a¯ is to ensure that the prize state is always preferred to the accuracy state.
32See Karni (2009) for a more detailed description of lottery method, though the method itself has been
described in a number of earlier papers.
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on [0, 1], here I use the uniform distribution. If the individual’s estimate p˜i ≥ r she is paid
an amount a > 0 if E occurs, and 0 if E does not occur. If p˜i < r, she plays a lottery that
pays out a with probability r, and 0 otherwise. It is relatively simple to show that truthful
reporting dominates any other report by the agent.33
In addition to the lottery method having the benefit of being incentive compatible,
unlike other proper-scoring rules such as the quadratic scoring rule, the method also has
advantages in terms of the theoretical predictions. Later in this section I will generate com-
parative static predictions for both BP and BB models. Using the lottery method allows
one to unambiguously distinguish the two models using the comparative static predictions,
a result that is not true of proper scoring rules in general.
The optimal probability report for the benchmark RE agent34 can be solved alge-
braically for this stylized model:35
max
p˜i
{
 ·
[
p˜i ·
(
pi · u(a)+ (1− pi) · u(0))+ (1− p˜i) · (1 + p˜i
2
· u(a)+ (6)(
1− 1 + p˜i
2
)
· u(0)
)]
+ (1− ) ·
[
pi · u(P + a¯)+ (1− pi) · u(a¯)]}
Note that P does not factor in to the optimization since p˜i has no bearing on this state
of the world.36 Hence I arrive at p˜iRE = pi for RE agents. I now turn to the question of
incentive compatibility for BP or BB agents. Before directly solving these agents’ problems,
I must impose more structure on the scope of what random elements of the experiment
might be subject to distorted beliefs.
An important assumption maintained throughout this paper is that individuals only
distort the primary probability of interest: the outcome of the binary event E occurring
with probability pi. In particular, the experimental design ensured that the determination of
secondary random elements of the experiment were highly transparent, including the nature
of how the accuracy versus the prize state is determined, and subjects had experience with
the lottery method and uniform distribution.37
33Note that a number of other methods commonly employed in the literature are not incentive compatible,
including proper scoring rules such as the quadratic scoring rule. See Armantier and Treich (2013) for theory
and experimental evidence of the performance of some of these rules.
34Here RE agents are assumed to have EU.
35For r ∼ U [0, 1], the probability r < p˜i = F (p˜i) = p˜i and E[r|r > p˜i] =
∫ 1
p˜i rdF (r)
1−F (p˜i) =
1+p˜i
2
.
36This result assumes independence between the prize and accuracy states.
37A literal interpretation of Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) would lead an individual to optimally believe
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Having said this, in Appendix A I take steps to show how the theoretical predictions
might be affected if subjects distort the probability of being in the accuracy state (with
baseline probability ), or distort perceptions of the distribution for how r (in the lottery
method) is drawn. There I introduce sufficient conditions such that the key theoretical
results in this paper continue to hold, even permitting this extension.
Given the assumption that only the probability of the outcome of E is distorted, I
arrive at Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. An agent in the experiment truthfully reports her belief, regardless of
whether she is a BP, BB, or RE agent.
Proof. Denote the belief of a BP agent by pˆiBP , the belief of a BB agent by pˆiBB, and
a standard RE agents by pˆiRE = pi. Since  > 0 the report p˜i is relevant to all agents,
while it has already been established that the lottery method is incentive compatible,
using the uniform distribution. In BP, agents choose actions as standard EU maximizers,
given optimal beliefs. In BB, the rational process also makes decisions as a EU maximizer,
given beliefs from the emotional process. Thus the objective problem for BP agents and the
rational process of a BB agent will look nearly identical to Equation 6, only now accounting
for distorted beliefs pˆi ∈ {pˆiBP , pˆiBB} rather than the truth pi.
max
p˜i
{
 ·
[
p˜i ·
(
pˆi · u(a)+ (1− pˆi) · u(0))+ (1− p˜i) · (1 + p˜i
2
· u(a)+ (7)(
1− 1 + p˜i
2
)
· u(0)
)]
+ (1− ) ·
[
pˆi · u(P + a¯)+ (1− pˆi) · u(a¯)]}
Setting the resulting first order condition to zero yields:
 ·
[(
u(a)− u(0)) · (pˆi − p˜i∗)] = 0
Leading to the optimal report p˜i∗ = pˆi.
Thus, regardless of whether an agent is a BP, BB, or RE type, she will truthfully report
a coin flip with payoff of one dollar if heads and ninety-nine cents if tails, that heads would occur with
absolute certainty. I argue this is not the context that the model is meant to apply to. Rather, individuals
must face events that have some element of subjectivity in order for any bias to emerge.
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her belief pˆi. The next section characterizes what optimal beliefs are for BP agents, followed
by BB agents.
3.3.1 Optimal Beliefs in Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) (BP)
In the BP model, utility at time t = 1 will be solely the anticipation of second period
income realizations (i.e. over earning P + a¯ if E occurs, a¯ otherwise) and anticipation over
the elicitation payment (i.e. over potentially earning a). Recall γ ∈ [0, 1] is the weight
on utility from anticipation, with γ = 0 corresponding to a standard RE agent. Utility at
time t = 1 is thus:
γ
[
 ·
(
p˜i · (pˆi · u(a) + (1− pˆi) · u(0)) + (1− p˜i) ·
(
1 + p˜i
2
· u(a)+ (8)
(1− 1 + p˜i
2
) · u(0)
))
+ (1− ) ·
(
pˆi · u(P + a¯) + (1− pˆi) · u(a¯)
)]
Utility at time t = 2 from second period consumption depends on the true probability,
pi:
 ·
(
p˜i · (pi · u(a) + (1− pi) · u(0)) + (1− p˜i) ·
(
1 + p˜i
2
· u(a)+ (9)
(1− 1 + p˜i
2
) · u(0)
))
+ (1− ) ·
(
pi · u(P + a¯) + (1− pi) · u(a¯)
)
From Proposition 1 it is known that p˜i = pˆi. Substituting this value in, the optimal
choice of pˆi is the maximization of 8 + 9, and is solved by:
pˆiBP =

pi if γ = 0.
min
{
pi
1−γ +
(1−)γ
(1−γ) · u(P+a¯)−u(a¯)u(a)−u(0) , 1
}
if 0 < γ < 1.
1 if γ = 1.
(10)
Note that beliefs are restricted to the interval [0, 1]. From Equation 10 it is clear
that this restriction may bind, leading to the optimal belief pˆiBP = 1. Optimal beliefs are
increasing in γ, the weight on anticipatory utility. When γ = 0 the utility from anticipation
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disappears, and optimal beliefs coincide with those of a standard RE agent, pˆiBP = pi. For
interior solutions, dpˆi
BP
dP > 0 and
dpˆiBP
da ≤ 0, with equality only when P = 0. Increasing
the prize payment P increases optimism, while increasing the accuracy payment a reduces
optimism.
3.3.2 Optimal Beliefs in Bracha and Brown (2012) (BB)
Since E is binary, the mental cost function can be written as J∗(pˆi, pi). It satisfies the
following properties: limpˆi→0 |J∗′(pˆi, pi)| = limpˆi→1 |J∗′(pˆi, pi)| = +∞ and limpˆi→0 J∗(pˆi, pi) =
limpˆi→1 J∗(pˆi, pi) = +∞, where J∗′(pˆi, pi) is the first derivative of J∗(pˆi, pi). As described
in an earlier section, these properties and the assumption that the mental cost function
approaches infinity at a higher rate than the utility function as pˆi → 0 or pˆi → 1 ensure
that optimal beliefs are always in the interior, pˆiBB ∈ (0, 1).
From Proposition 1, the rational process of a BB agent will truthfully report p˜i = pˆi.
I thus proceed to the determination of optimal beliefs pˆiBB. Optimal beliefs will be de-
termined by the intersection of the best response functions of the emotional and rational
processes. The emotional process must select an optimal belief pˆi, given an action (proba-
bility report) p˜i of the rational process.
max
pˆi
{
 ·
[
p˜i ·
(
pˆi · u(a)+ (1− pˆi) · u(0))+ (11)
(
1− p˜i) · (1 + p˜i
2
· u(a)+ (1− 1 + p˜i
2
)
· u(0)
)]
+
(1− ) ·
[
pˆi · u(P + a¯)+ (1− pˆi) · u(a¯)]− J∗(pˆi, pi)}
Setting the first order condition equal to zero gives the best response function of the
emotional process, given p˜i from the rational process:
 · p˜i ·
(
u
(
a
)− u(0))+ (1− ) · (u(P + a¯)− u(a¯))− J∗′(pˆi, pi) = 0
The Nash Equilibrium is the intersection of the best response function of the emotional
and rational process. As has been shown, the best response function of the rational process
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Figure 3: Best Response (BR) Functions
Blank Space
(a) pi = 0.1
Blank
Space
(b) pi = 0.5
(c) pi = 0.9
Blank
Space
(d) Equilibrium for pi ∈ (0, 1)
(a) to (c) illustrate sample best response curves for pi ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}, where p˜i is the report
of the rational process (best response in red) and pˆi is the belief of the emotional process
(best response in black). (d) plots optimal beliefs as a function of the true probability
pi ∈ (0, 1). The dotted line is the 45◦ line.
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is the truthful report p˜i = pˆi. Substituting this into the equation above implicitly defines
optimal beliefs pˆiBB, which can be seen in Figure 3 and mathematically in Equation (12).
 · pˆiBB ·
(
u
(
a
)− u(0))+ (1− ) · (u(P + a¯)− u(a¯))− J∗′(pˆiBB, pi) = 0 (12)
The two leftmost terms in the equation relate to the benefits of belief bias, while the
final term represents the marginal (mental) cost of these beliefs. Regardless of whether this
is modeled as a simultaneous moves game, or a sequential moves game with the emotional
process as the first mover, the equilibrium is identical.38
The optimal belief will be pˆiBB ≥ pi. J∗(pˆi, pi) takes a minimum at pˆi = pi, and is
decreasing on [0, pi] and increasing on [pi, 1]. Looking at Equation (12) one can see that
pˆi = pi gives a strictly higher payoff than any pˆi ∈ [0, pi), since a > 0, P > 0 and J∗(pˆi, pi) ≥
J∗(pi, pi) for any pˆi ∈ [0, 1]. The optimum will thus lie in the interval [pi, 1].
J∗′
(
pˆi, pi
)
is continuous, non-negative on [pi, 1], equal to zero at pˆi = pi and limpˆi→1 J∗
′(
pˆi, pi
)
=
+∞. Thus a solution to the above equation exists. Additionally, because J∗(pˆi, pi) is strictly
convex, the solution is unique.
The basis of the experiment is changing the parameters P and a which have different
implications for the two models. I now look at comparative static results for the BB agent.
First I look at the change in optimal beliefs with respect to a change in the prize P (where
J∗′′
(
pˆiBB, pi
)
is the second derivative of J∗(pˆi, pi)). I perturb Equation (12) around the
equilibrium to examine how optimal beliefs change as a function of P .
dpˆiBB
dP
=
(1− ) · u′(P + a¯)
J∗′′
(
pˆiBB, pi
)−  · (u(a)− u(0)) > 0
The denominator of this expression J∗′′
(
pˆiBB, pi
) −  · (u(a)− u(0)) is positive which
follows directly from the second order condition for being at a maximum. Next it is possible
to look at how optimal beliefs change with respect to the accuracy payment a:
38One can show that in Equation 11 if p˜i is replaced with pˆi (the emotional process uses backward induction
to determine the rational process’ best response), the FOC is identical. The equilibrium would not in general
be identical if the rational process moved first.
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dpˆiBB
da
=
 · pˆiBB · u′(a)
J∗′′
(
pˆiBB, pi
)−  · (u(a)− u(0)) > 0
dpˆiBB
da > 0 may seem counter-intuitive, however it is logical upon reflection. The key
is that the payoffs a and P have no effect on the marginal costs of holding biased beliefs
(costs are only present in the mental cost function), they only affect the marginal bene-
fits.39 Under the lottery method of belief elicitation, the probability of receiving payment
a is increasing in the probability of the event being predicted. Increasing a leads to an
increase in the marginal benefit of increasing pˆi, but leaves marginal costs unchanged. This
unambiguously increases the BB agent’s optimal belief.
Hypotheses
Equations 10 and (12) are the key equations that inform the experimental
design. In particular, implicit differentiation gives clear comparative static results that
as the financial stake P increases, the degree of bias of pˆi increases under both models.
However, as the accuracy incentive payment a increases, the degree of bias decreases for
BP agents, but increases for BB agents.
It has already been shown that for all three agents, BP, BB, and RE, the optimal p˜i∗
will be to truthfully report optimal beliefs pˆi∗. Given the comparative static predictions
for BP and BB models, it is possible to vary the parameters P and a in the lab in order
to test the following experimental predictions:40
Hypothesis 1:
dpˆi∗
dP
> 0 for BP and BB agents,
dpˆi∗
dP
= 0 for a RE agent.
39This statement is not true of the BB model in general, as parameters of a game may affect marginal
costs. It is true for this game, because actions correspond to probability reports under the lottery method.
40In BP, these comparative static predictions require that individuals are not at a corner solution for
the level of belief bias. This assumption is easily tested, by checking whether or not subjects’ probability
reports are at the boundary p˜i = 1.
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Hypothesis 2:
dpˆi∗
da
< 0 for an BP agent when P > 0,
dpˆi∗
da
= 0 for a RE agent and an BP agent when P = 0, and
dpˆi∗
da
> 0 for a BB agent.
4 Experimental Design
This experiment was designed to closely fit the stylized model presented in the previous
section that tests the predictions of the Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) (BP) and Bracha
and Brown (2012) (BB) models. The motivation and design with testable hypotheses was
outlined in a grant proposal to the Russell Sage Foundation, prior to the experimental data
collection.41 As the primary outcomes of interest in the experiment are elicited beliefs, I
utilize the design introduced in Section 3.3 that eliminates incentives for non risk-neutral
subjects to hedge payoffs between the accuracy and prize states.42
The experiment utilizes a 3x2 between subjects design, which can be seen in Figure 4.
Three accuracy payment levels, a, were randomized at the session level, low ($3), moderate
($10), or high ($20).43 The accuracy payments were only relevant when subjects ended up
in the accuracy state, revealed at the end of the experiment.
Two prize payment levels, P ∈ {$0, $80}, were randomized at the subject-event level.
These potential payments were only relevant when subjects ended up in the prize state.
Half of subjects had the chance to earn an extra $80 if the event occurred, while the other
half would earn nothing ($0) extra. A fixed payment of a¯ = $20 was provided conditional
on ending up in the prize state, but independent of the event. a¯ ≥ a was chosen so that
41Specifically, details of this design were provided in Grant Proposal #98-14-06 for the Russell Sage
Foundation, which outlined that the design would test both BP and BB models.
42This design has been previously utilized with similar aims in Blanco et al. (2010), who also showed
that when incentives to hedge are transparent individuals in experiments do take advantage of hedging
opportunities.
43Sessions were evenly split across the three treatments. Optimal cost-benefit sample ratio calculations
suggested over-sampling low payment relative to high, however this optimal number of additional subjects
was less than the size of an average session.
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Figure 4: Experimental Design
Session
Low
Moderate
High
Prize
$20
{$20, $100}
$20
{$20, $100}
$20
{$20, $100}
Accuracy
{$0, $3}
{$0, $10}
{$0, $20}
50% 50%
Sessions were allocated between low, moderate, and high accuracy payments (the ‘3’ in the ‘3x2’ design).
Within sessions, subjects had a 50% chance of ending up in the Prize state or the Accuracy state. In the
accuracy state ex-ante payments were fixed. In the prize state, half of the subjects could potentially earn
an extra $80 if the event occurred, while the other half would receive no such bonus (the ‘2’ in the ‘3x2’
design).
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the prize state would always be strictly preferred to the accuracy state.44
Subjects faced a sequence of four independent events presented in random order.45 One
of the four events was randomly selected at the end of the experiment for payment. Figure
5 summarizes the four events that all individuals faced. All events had binary outcomes,
and the outcome of each event was always determined before subjects submitted their
probability reports. Of course, subjects did not know the outcome when they submitted
these reports. Two events I consider “objective” (using the earlier definition), and involved
rolls of the dice that differed in how cognitively demanding it was to calculate the underlying
probability. The outcome of these events was determined by chance, and individuals could
not affect these outcomes.
For these dice events, the experiment also examined whether there were any differences
in beliefs when individuals were given control over selecting their own numbers. Half of the
subjects were in this control treatment, while for the other half the computer randomly
selected the numbers for them.46 The motivation for this treatment was to test the hy-
pothesis that individuals given control would be more optimistic about the event occurring,
based on psychological evidence about the “illusion of control”, as in Langer (1975).
For the other two events, decisions taken before the experiment could affect the out-
come. These two events involved respectively, performance on a skill testing quiz, and
estimating the temperature on a randomly selected day in the previous year. Because the
weather and quiz exercises were completed before the experiment began, subjects did not
know their potential prize payment P at the time they completed these tasks.
The quiz event involved whether a subject scored in the top 15% on a five minute skill
testing quiz47 that was taken by all subjects. Subjects were incentivized by being truthfully
informed that achieving a high score on the quiz would result in an increased chance at
earning an extra $80.48 A random subset of students (30%) were selected as a control
44For any individual with non-degenerate beliefs.
45One of the events (easy dice) was fixed as the final event. The other three events were randomly ordered
at the session level.
46The control condition was randomized within subjects, not within events. Hence a subject either had
control over both dice events, or neither. The subjects were only aware of their own arrangement, and had
no knowledge that any other arrangement existed.
47The quiz was a multiple choice quiz consisting of math and verbal questions. To determine whether
a subject was in the top 15% they were compared to a reference group of students taking the same quiz
during pilot sessions.
48Subject feedback indicated that this was a strong incentive to put in effort on the quiz. Additionally,
out of 219 subjects for which I have choice time data, the fastest person finished in 3 minutes (177 seconds).
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Figure 5: Description of Events
(a) Hard Dice: The computer rolls four
dice. Event occurs when exactly two out
of those four dice was a specified number
(e.g. 4). In the control treatment individ-
uals select this number. The probability of
this is
(
4
2
) (
1
6
)2 ( 5
6
)2
= 1501296 or approximately
11.57%.
Blank
Space
(b) Easy Dice: The computer rolls two dice.
Event occurs when two different specified
numbers were the only numbers to come up
(e.g. 5-3, or 3-5, 3-3, 5-5). In the control
treatment individuals select the two num-
bers. The probability of this is 436 or ap-
proximately 11.11%.
Blank Space
(c) Weather: Event occurs if the individual
correctly estimated the average temperature
on a specified random day in NYC in the pre-
vious year (2013), +/- 5 deg F. In the sample,
25.77% of subjects were in the correct range.
Blank
Space
(d) Quiz: Event occurs if the individual
scored in the top 15% on a skill-testing mul-
tiple choice quiz, relative to students in pilot
sessions (self). For a subset of participants
the event pertained to a random partner’s
performance instead of their own (other).
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group, where the event was tied to the performance of a random anonymous partner in the
room, rather than to their own performance. Finally, the weather event involved correctly
estimating the average temperature on a given, random day in the previous calendar year
(2013) in New York City.49
4.1 Timing and Procedures
This experiment was conducted at New York University (NYU), in New York, at the Center
for Experimental and Social Science (CESS).50 Recruitment was done via the CESS online
system, which notifies undergraduate students by email when an experiment is scheduled.
A total of 318 subjects participated51, in 32 different sessions for an average of 10 subjects
per session. The average subject payment was $24.96 for approximately 75 minutes. All
subjects were given a $10 show up payment in addition to anything earned during the
experiment. Due to the nature of the experimental design, final subject payments including
show up fee ranged from as low as $10, to as high as $110.
In order to address concerns about the difficulty of understanding the lottery method,
approximately half (35 minutes) of the experiment consisted of lengthy instructions, along
with practice sessions on the computer (in z-Tree; Fischbacher (2007)) to help subjects get
used to the elicitation procedure.52
After the detailed practice outlining the lottery method and payment structure, sub-
jects took the five minute skill testing quiz, followed by answering the weather question.53
The reason the quiz and weather questions were placed before elicitation was that it was
important that subjects did not know what stake they would have in an event when an-
swering these questions. If some subjects knew they had a chance at earning $80 for a top
93% (203) of subjects finished in at least 4 minutes out of the 5 minutes maximum.
49Subjects needed to be within a 5 degree Fahrenheit window in order to be correct. As in the quiz
question, subjects were given this question before the experiment began, and were told a correct answer
would lead to an increased chance of earning $80.
50Experimental data collection was conducted under NYU IRB #10-8117.
51The experimental design called for 294 subjects - 98 per accuracy payment group. Sessions were run in
all accuracy payment sessions until this minimum number (98) was reached. In one session (with 8 subjects)
the experimental software crashed, leading to data for only one event. Including this session brings the
total to 326.
52Subject feedback suggested that they had a good understanding of the lottery method by the end of
the practice section.
53The quiz terminated automatically after five minutes, while the weather question prompted individuals
for an answer at the end of two minutes. No subject took longer than two minutes to answer the weather
question.
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performance, while others knew they had no chance at earning $80, exerted effort could be
different.
After the quiz and weather questions, subjects were introduced to their potential stake
in the event, P ∈ {$0, $80}, each equally likely. To ensure this was as transparent as
possible I came around with a bag that was filled with a number of poker chips equal to
the number of subjects in the room.54 Half of the chips were clearly labelled $0, while the
other half were labelled $80. The probability of drawing P = $80 was thus set at 50%,
which corresponds to  = 0.5. One by one subjects would draw a chip from the bag, until
every subject had a chip. The amount of money on the chip determined how much extra,
P , they would earn if in the prize state and the event had occurred.55
This random draw of chips was repeated before each of the four events, which made
it clear that the drawing of P was independent across events. With the exception of the
physical drawing of chips, the rest of the experiment took place on lab computers using the
experimental software z-Tree. Each chip had a unique code that would load the specified
amount into the computer. After all subjects entered this code into the computer, the
event was introduced to all subjects. Subjects were informed that the event did not change
based on whether they drew a $0 or an $80 chip. They then proceeded to have their beliefs
elicited about the event. This procedure was repeated four times, once for every event.
After elicitation for all four events was complete, I came around one final time with two
bags. The first bag contained an equal number of Red (meaning accuracy state) and Blue
(meaning prize state) poker chips, with the total equal to the number of subjects.56 The
chip drawn from this bag determined whether a subject was paid for their decisions during
the elicitation procedure (red, for which they could earn a ∈ {$3, $10, $20} depending on
the session), or was paid according to the prize state (blue) whereby they earned a¯ = $20
automatically, plus potentially the amount on their prize chip, P ∈ {$0, $80}. The second
bag contained an equal number of chips for each of the four events.57
Across the four events I intentionally chose to investigate belief bias in different do-
mains, leading to differences across events. Of the four, the two dice events are the closest
in similarity. Since in the model of Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) biased beliefs are
54When the number of subjects was odd, an additional poker chip was placed in the bag to make the
number even.
55Additionally that event had to have been randomly selected for payment, of the four.
56Again when the number of subjects was odd, an additional chip was placed in the bag.
57The number of chips in this bag was equal to the smallest multiple of four that was greater than or
equal to the number of subjects.
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constrained only by the accuracy payment a, one would expect that since both dice events
have nearly identical objective probabilities, bias will be identical conditional on a and P .
On the other hand, a straightforward interpretation of Bracha and Brown (2012) suggests
that the mental cost of distorting reality would be greater for the simpler dice event, hence
conditional on a and P the bias on the simpler dice event should be smaller than on the
more difficult dice event.58
A direct comparison between the objective and more subjective events is less straight-
forward, and not possible without further restrictions on the models. Again Bracha and
Brown (2012) predict a higher degree of bias for the subjective events, however this does
not translate into a testable prediction for the experimental data.
5 Experimental Results
Basic demographic data was collected on subjects including gender, university major, age,
as well as standardized questions from psychology designed to measure generalized opti-
mism.59 Summary statistic tables can be found in Appendix B.1, showing that covariates
are balanced across both treatments.
I first present an overview of individual’s initial reports for the probability they believed
a given event would occur, p˜ii. Table 1 presents summary statistics for individual priors for
each of the four events, separating the quiz event into whether it involved one’s own score
(self), or a random partner’s score (other). Here the 3x2 treatments are aggregated and
summarized by event. The final row presents these summary reports for all events pooled
together.
It is clear from Table 1 that there is fairly substantial bias across all events. For the two
dice events, defining the “true” probability pi is straightforward. For the weather event the
actual proportion of subjects who estimated the correct temperature range, 25.77% was
used. For the quiz pi = 15% was used, which was the proportion of subjects who scored
58This statement is not intended to exclude other potential explanations, these are discussed later in the
results section.
59After the experiment subjects were asked four questions taken from the Life Orientation Test - Revised
(LOT-R) a revised version of a test used in psychology to distinguish generalized optimism versus pessimism.
This revised version was developed and subsequently published by Scheier et al. (1994). Their original test
involves 10 questions, however 4 are “fillers” which are not considered when constructing an index. Four
of the six questions remaining were selected for the post-experiment questionnaire.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics About Reported Beliefs (p˜ii)
Event “Truth” (pi) µp˜i Upward Bias Q2,p˜i σp˜i N
Dice Easy 11.11 17.09 53.81% 11.00 15.47 318
Dice Hard 11.57 20.77 79.55% 15.00 18.04 318
Weather 25.77 63.23 145.36% 65.00 20.54 326
Quiz Self 15.00 50.18 234.53% 50.00 27.49 223
Quiz Other 15.00 26.69 77.96% 20.00 17.82 95
All 15.92 36.23 127.60% 30.00 27.91 1280
“Truth” refers to the baseline underlying probability of the event. µp˜i is the mean of the belief report p˜ii,
Q2,p˜i is the median, and σp˜i is the standard deviation.
in the top 15% relative to a similar reference group.60 Of course, this does not mean that
every subject should report a prior of 15%, due to heterogeneity in test ability.61
That all probability reports are biased upwards is consistent with the predictions of
both models, and of optimism models in general. The qualitative predictions of Bracha
and Brown (2012) appear to be borne out in this table. The average bias for the harder dice
event is higher than that of the easier dice event, and the more subjective events appear to
have larger degrees of bias. However, while these results are suggestive that individuals hold
optimistic beliefs, they are by no means conclusive. Similar patterns could be generated by
models of bounded rationality or costly effort, since errors are unlikely to be symmetrically
distributed. In order to conclusively rule out such other explanations, I now turn to the
results examining the comparative statics.
5.1 Comparative Static Predictions of Optimism Models
This section provides an overview of the empirical strategy, and results for testing the two
major comparative static predictions of both BP and BB.62 For the empirical analysis, the
dependent variable is the reported belief p˜iij of individual i for event j. 1 ≤ j ≤ 5, an
60Subjects were informed the reference group consisted of students just like them, taking the same quiz.
61A side note is that the LOT-R questions often used to measure generalized optimism have no relationship
with probability reports in this experiment.
62The comparative static predictions of BP required an interior solution of pˆiBP < 1. Less than 2%
of responses reported extreme beliefs of 100%, indicating that comparative static estimates near zero are
unlikely to have resulted from individuals being at a corner solution.
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integer, is an indicator for the two dice events, the weather event, the quiz event (self) and
finally the quiz event (other), in that order.
5.1.1 Testing Hypothesis 1: Does optimism bias increase with the prize stake
Pij?
The first comparative static of interest is the coefficient β1 on a dummy variable for whether
the individual was given a prize stake Pij > 0 for a given event j.
p˜iij = β1 · 1{Pij > 0}+
∑
1≤j≤5
γj · Ej + η · Si · E4 + αk + ij (13)
The dependent variable p˜iij is the reported belief of the subject regarding the percent
chance of an event occurring, coded between 0 and 100. The independent variable of
interest is an indicator of whether or not the subject had an $80 prize stake in the event,
1{Pij > 0}. Ej is an event specific fixed effect, αk is a session level fixed effect, and ij
is an idiosyncratic error for each probability report. In the analysis standard errors are
clustered at the individual level.
Heterogeneity in ability will be an important factor in the determination of the prob-
ability that one believes they scored in the top 15%. To account for this heterogeneity, I
interact score on the quiz with the fixed effect for the quiz (self) event.63 Si is the subject’s
score on the quiz, E4 = 1 only if the event was the quiz (self) event. Since the quiz was
conducted before the experiment began, subjects did not know whether they would face
P = $80 or P = $0, so there is no concern about endogeneity of Pij .
Regarding the weather event, there is no significant relationship between how far off
one’s temperature estimate was from the truth and the probability that individual believed
they were within 5 degrees of the truth so I do not include this interaction in the table.64
Recall that both models predict that individuals given a positive financial stake in an
event will believe the event to be more likely to occur, i.e. β1 > 0. This is in contrast to
the standard RE model where β1 = 0. I now examine whether there are patterns in the
63The fit is not substantially improved with non-linear estimates nor non-parametric estimates. Reassur-
ingly, the results are unchanged using a non-linear or non-parametric relationship so I control for test score
using a linear relationship.
64In other words, unlike the quiz, reported beliefs are not correlated with reality. Including it does not
affect the results.
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data consistent with the comparative statics in Hypothesis 1.
Table 2 examines the comparative static predictions for each of the three accuracy
groups, as well as for the aggregate data. From this table it is evident that having a
prize stake is only significant in the low accuracy payment (a = $3) sessions, where β1
is significant and positive at the 1% level. Due to the presence of non-normality in the
residuals, two-tailed p-values calculated using Fisher’s exact test are included in Table 2,
and do not substantively alter any inferences.65
The effect size of β1 for a = $3 is sizeable, and corresponds to a 5.82 percentage point
increase in the prior probability reported by an individual, or a 17% increase from the
mean probability report in those sessions. For the other accuracy payment sessions, and
the aggregate data, the effect of stakes is not significant. On the whole, there is evidence
of optimism bias when individuals are given a prize stake in the event, but only when
accuracy payments are low.
Looking at the coefficient on quiz score for the Quiz (self) event, overall scoring an
additional point on the quiz resulted in an approximately 2.2 percentage point increase
in the probability reported of scoring in the top 15%. Put another way, a one-standard
deviation increase in test score results in a 5.8 percentage point increase in the belief
about the probability of scoring in the top 15%. Interestingly, the relationship between
quiz score and beliefs about scoring in the top 15% seems to be strongest at the lowest
accuracy payment ($3), and gets weaker as the accuracy payments increase. A similarly
counterintuitive pattern of beliefs being less connected to reality can be observed looking at
the event-level fixed effects: increasing accuracy payments is related to increases in average
probability reports for these events. The next section examines Hypothesis 2 which will
specifically address patterns of beliefs in response to variation in accuracy payment levels.
65Further details are provided in Appendix C.
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Table 2: Impact of Financial Prize on Beliefs (Testing Hypothesis 1)
All Events
Regressor Acc = $3 Acc = $10 Acc = $20 All
{P = $80} (β1) 5.824 -0.190 -2.090 1.320
(2.149)*** (1.680) (2.158) (1.190)
[P-Value] [0.008]*** [0.910] [0.335] [0.268]
{P-Value Fisher Exact} {0.004}??? {0.918} {0.288} {0.240}
Easy Dice (γ1) 10.636 10.120 16.665 8.415
(5.511)* (3.757)*** (2.538)*** (3.659)**
Hard Dice (γ2) 11.902 12.310 24.324 12.075
(5.776)** (3.906)*** (2.667)*** (3.711)***
Weather (γ3) 54.360 55.737 65.285 54.438
(5.944)*** (4.606)*** (2.820)*** (4.000)***
Quiz (Self) (γ4) 24.040 32.134 60.096 33.218
(7.303)*** (5.877)*** (5.790)*** (4.806)***
Quiz (Other) (γ5) 14.191 15.776 36.321 17.982
(6.100)** (4.184)*** (4.496)*** (3.985)***
Score × Quiz (Self) (η) 3.685 2.618 -0.771 2.172
(1.023)*** (0.959)*** (1.251) (0.647)***
Session Fixed Effects (α) YES YES YES YES
N 424 436 420 1280
R2 0.490 0.556 0.529 0.513
Difference is significant at * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at individual level.
Constant omitted as
∑5
j=1Ej = 1. R
2 corrected for no-intercept.
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5.1.2 Testing Hypothesis 2: Does optimism bias change with accuracy stakes?
I next turn to examining Hypothesis 2, regarding the accuracy payments a. Hypothesis 2
made opposing predictions for the two models regarding increases in accuracy payments.
The model of Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) (BP) predicts that as the accuracy payment
a increases, individuals will respond to the increased incentive for accuracy and report less
biased probabilities. The model of Bracha and Brown (2012) (BB) predicts that as a
increases, individuals will actually report more biased probabilities as the likelihood of
receiving the accuracy payment is increasing in the probability the event occurs.
The empirical estimation of Hypothesis 2 is similar to Equation (13), here β2 is the
coefficient of interest, demonstrating the relationship between accuracy incentive payment
a and beliefs p˜iij . Since a was randomized at the session level, I do not include session fixed
effects.
p˜iij = β2 · a+
∑
1≤j≤5
γj · Ej + η · Si · E4 + ij (14)
Table 3 presents the results from the specification in Equation (14). Examining this
table, one can see that increasing the accuracy payments tends to increase optimism, a
prediction uniquely made by BB but one that is inconsistent with BP. For the entire sample
the coefficient on β2 is significant at the 1% level, with the same result examining p-values
using Fisher’s (two-tailed) exact test.66
Note that here it is possible that a fraction of subjects were reporting “pessimistic”
priors (p˜iij < pij), such that optimism bias coincides with becoming more accurate.
67 How-
ever, the comparative static predictions of both models are independent of the prior belief,
such that Equation (14) is correctly specified for the question of interest. Nonetheless, in
Appendix B.2 I examine the same question for only subjects with upwardly biased priors.
Not surprisingly, given the sizeable bias in probability reports across all sessions (as seen
in Table 1), the increase in the accuracy payment does in fact result in even more bias.
Again it is important to control for Quiz score. Since subjects effort on the quiz could
be affected by the accuracy payment, one concern is that these results are in part driven by
higher test scores that resulted from higher effort exerted when accuracy payments were
66Again, Appendix C describes in further detail the procedure taken for this test.
67In the data, only 22% of subjects had pessimistic or unbiased probability reports.
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larger. However, the effect remains significant controlling for test scores, and in fact is still
significant when the entire Quiz (Self) event is removed from the analysis.68
That larger accuracy payments are associated with more biased probability reports
seems entirely driven by events for which subjects had no prize stake. For this group, the
average effect is quite substantial. Increasing the lottery method’s payment by $2.25 would
result in a 1 percentage point increase in the reported belief. Increasing stakes from $3 to
$20 has the effect of increasing beliefs by 7.5 percentage points. This is actually larger than
the average effect of having a prize stake of $80 in the event (which was 5.82 percentage
points).
As a final note, the model in BP predicts that when there is No Stake, bias should
not change as accuracy payments are varied. However this is rejected at the 1% level.
Overall, the BP model cannot explain the patterns generated in the experiment, while the
BB model comparative static predictions do match the observed data.
68It is also reassuring that, as shown in Appendix B.1, test scores do not significantly differ across
treatments.
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Table 3: Impact of Accuracy Payment on Beliefs (Testing Hypothesis 2)
All Events
Regressor No Stake Stake = $80 All
Accuracy Payment (β2) 0.444 0.052 0.250
(0.116)*** (0.145) (0.094)***
[P-Value] [0.000]*** [0.720] [0.008]***
{P-Value Fisher Exact} {0.000}??? {0.659} {0.002}???
Easy Dice (γ1) 11.146 17.660 14.345
(1.575)*** (2.428)*** (1.491)***
Hard Dice (γ2) 15.327 20.810 18.030
(1.811)*** (2.321)*** (1.503)***
Weather (γ3) 57.772 63.199 60.493
(2.091)*** (2.234)*** (1.590)***
Quiz (Self) (γ4) 35.878 42.811 39.400
(4.993)*** (4.416)*** (3.303)***
Quiz (Other) (γ5) 21.429 26.456 23.967
(2.653)*** (2.951)*** (2.025)***
Score × Quiz (Self) (η) 2.367 1.831 2.110
(0.992)** (0.838)** (0.645)***
Session Fixed Effects NO NO NO
N 646 634 1280
R2 0.528 0.469 0.495
Difference is significant at * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at individual level.
Constant omitted as
∑5
j=1Ej = 1. R
2 corrected for no-intercept.
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5.2 Discussion of Results
Looking at the comparative static predictions from Hypotheses 1 and 2, it is clear that
the BB model seems to fit the pattern of results observed, while the BP model cannot
account for these patterns. Providing subjects with larger payments for giving accurate
responses does not reduce optimistic bias, but has the opposite effect. Such results provide
evidence that the level of bias is not constrained by the financial costs that result from
poor decisions taken in the experiment (i.e. the expected monetary loss from reporting
an inaccurate belief). Instead the results support the theory of BB which emphasizes the
direct costs of distorting reality in belief determination.
These results are consistent with the experiment of Mayraz (2014), who found evidence
of optimistic belief formation when eliciting beliefs about hypothetical future stock prices.
In his experiment, half of the sessions involved subjects whose income was increasing in
future price, while the other half involved subjects whose income was decreasing in the
price. Using a logarithmic scoring rule (LSR), he found that subjects were optimistically
biased, and that this bias was larger when accuracy payments increased, as in the current
study. Under the LSR, the BB model does not make unambiguous predictions for how
optimistic bias will change, but to my knowledge it is the only model of optimistic belief
formation that is not inconsistent with the results of Mayraz (2014).
Looking back to the results in this paper, from the data in Tables 2 and 3, it is clear
that not all treatments are positive and statistically significant, as would be predicted in
the theory of BB. In particular, when accuracy payments are moderate ($10) or high ($20),
from Table 2 one can see that β1 is slightly negative, though not significantly different from
zero. In Table 3, when the prize P is large ($80) the estimated β2 is positive, but very
small and not statistically significant.
Small but positive effects for these treatments are to be expected if subjects are nearing
the limit of their ability to distort reality. If this is true, because of the shape of the mental
cost function J∗(·), increasing the benefits to optimistic belief formation will only result
in minor changes to optimal beliefs. This can account for the findings in Table 3 (Column
2), but cannot explain the findings in Table 2 (Columns 2 and 3).
One explanation is that probability reports are subject to idiosyncratic error, or that
there is unobserved heterogeneity in the mental cost function J∗(·).69 One could also
69In a between subjects design, if this heterogeneity is not balanced across treatments, it can lead to
erroneous negative estimates (non-statistically significant), as observed in the data. A different explanation
can be found if one extends the model to allow subjects to also distort perceptions about the probability of
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examine a different empirical specification that nests the two hypotheses, as well as allows
for interactions between the Prize and Accuracy payments. Appendix D investigates this
approach, and finds that the coefficients on both the Prize and Accuracy treatments are
positive and significant for the entire sample, while the interaction term is negative and
significant at the 5% level.
5.3 The Illusion of Control?
As described earlier, 50% of subjects were required to select numbers themselves for the
events involving rolls of the dice. For example, the hard dice event involved rolling four
dice, and occurred when a given number came up in exactly two of the four rolls. Subjects
in the control treatment70 were asked to select this number, while those not in the control
treatment had their number selected by the computer.71
Giving subjects a sense of control was intended to examine the “illusion of control”
finding of Langer (1975). The illusion of control is a tendency to overestimate one’s ability
to exert influence over events. Here, the hypothesis is that individuals with control will
believe that the dice event of interest is more likely than individuals who do not have
control over selecting the numbers.
Table 4 examines this hypothesis, and investigates potential interactions between con-
trol and accuracy or prize payments. From this table it is possible to see that control does
not lead to more optimistic estimates of the probability of events. However, the interac-
tion with the prize stake is borderline significant. Although not significant at conventional
levels, in fact in Appendix E I show that specifically for the dice events only, the effect
found in testing Hypothesis 1 is entirely driven by subjects with control.
ending up in the accuracy state () and distorting perceptions about the distribution used in the elicitation
procedure. In Appendix A.2, I take steps to show how these comparative static results change when allowing
agents more flexibility in what probabilities they can hold biased beliefs over. These results demonstrate
how comparative static predictions of the BB model are unchanged when a is low and/or P = $0. However
it is possible that for P = $80 and larger a, these results are no longer unambiguously positive, which may
explain these findings in the data.
70These subjects had control over selecting their numbers, not to be confused with the standard control
group terminology.
71Subjects were only told of their treatment, and were not aware of other subjects’ conditions. For the
easy dice event there were two numbers selected.
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Table 4: Examining the Illusion of Control
All Events
Regressor
Control × Dice -1.638 -3.243 -1.679 -1.121
(1.544) (1.682)* (1.561) (2.841)
{P = $80} (β1) 1.295 0.476
(1.191) (1.378)
Control × Dice × {P = $80} 3.332
(2.401)
Accuracy Payment (β2) 0.250 0.262
(0.094)*** (0.111)**
Control × Dice × Acc Payment -0.051
(0.193)
Easy Dice (γ1) 9.275 9.747 15.171 15.035
(3.760)** (3.786)*** (1.740)*** (1.877)***
Hard Dice (γ2) 12.936 13.361 18.857 18.720
(3.813)*** (3.835)*** (1.761)*** (1.929)***
Weather (γ3) 54.495 54.937 60.496 60.359
(4.002)*** (4.023)*** (1.591)*** (1.744)***
Quiz (Self) (γ4) 33.275 33.820 39.402 39.271
(4.801)*** (4.822)*** (3.308)*** (3.354)***
Quiz (Other) (γ5) 18.041 18.524 23.970 23.835
(3.982)*** (4.022)*** (2.023)*** (2.060)***
Score × Quiz (Self) (η) 2.172 2.142 2.110 2.110
(0.648)*** (0.646)*** (0.645)*** (0.645)***
Session Fixed Effects (α) YES YES NO NO
N 1280 1280 1280 1280
R2 0.514 0.515 0.495 0.496
Difference is significant at * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at individual level.
Constant omitted as
∑5
j=1Ej = 1. R
2 corrected for no-intercept.
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5.4 Alternative Explanations
In the previous section I argued that the results are consistent with the model of Bracha
and Brown (2012). This section is intended to examine whether the patterns observed
might be consistent with other theoretical models.
First, a number of explanations may be consistent with probability reports that are
biased upwards. Because probabilities are naturally restricted to lie in [0, 1], and because
in the experimental design pi < 12 , it is plausible that errors will be right skewed, consistent
with the experimental results.
In particular, models of costly effort and/or attention might generate these patterns.
However, they are unable to explain the comparative static results. Costs of effort are
structurally unrelated to prize payments, while increasing payments for accuracy will in-
crease the returns to effort. As a result, effort should increase, and probability reports
should become less biased. This is contrary to the observation that dpˆida > 0. Similarly
for models of inattention, increasing accuracy payments a or prize payments P would be
expected to increase attention, and thus decrease bias. This is the opposite of what is
observed.
Two explanations that could potentially generate the comparative static findings are
“Buckling under pressure” or “Satisficing”. First, it is possible that individuals might make
more errors when the stakes are higher, for example because they do not perform well under
pressure. Thus, if subjects can earn $20 from the lottery method, they feel pressure about
earning this relatively large amount of money and this leads them to make mistakes. Such
behavior could generate similar patterns to those observed in the experiment. However, I
also have an independent measure of performance under pressure, subjects’ scores on the
Quiz. And in fact, while there are no statistically significant differences between the three
accuracy payment sessions, quiz scores are one half-point higher in the $10 and $20 sessions
relative to the $3 sessions. Such findings seem to rule out that subjects find it difficult to
perform under pressure.
The second explanation is that subjects might only have preferences over earning a
minimum amount of money during the experiment, and once this reference level of income
is (ex-ante) reached they may no longer find it worthwhile to exert effort. Thus for the $20
accuracy sessions, subjects might have expectations of earning enough money such that
they are content to exert little effort, while for the $3 sessions they are faced with low
expected earnings and are willing to exert more effort to increase their expected pay-out.
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While I have no way to directly refute the predictions of such a model, it is possible
to examine subject choice time as a proxy for effort. On average subjects in the $3 and
$10 sessions took about 32 seconds to submit their probability report, while those in $20
sessions took about 29 seconds, a non-statistically significant difference. Subjects did
however spend about 5 seconds longer on their report when they had an $80 Stake in the
event, a difference significant at the 10% level. If choice time is a proxy for effort then it
would seem that subjects did not exert less effort when the stakes or accuracy payments
were higher, which such a model would suggest.
As a final comment on the viability of costly effort models to explain patterns in the
data, I note that the experimental design did not provide any advantages to finishing any
of the tasks faster. Subjects who made probability reports faster than their peers had to
wait until the next task, and were not permitted to engage in any other activities. If there
are costs of boredom, these should work to ensure that subjects were focused on probability
reports when they had the opportunity.
5.4.1 Relation to Models from Decision Theory
This experiment is also related to decision theoretic models that seek to explain deviations
from expected utility. Focusing only on the accuracy state, the lottery method used to elicit
probability reports in this experiment is theoretically equivalent to pairwise comparisons of
two lotteries. The first lottery pays out a if the event of interest happens, and 0 otherwise
(denote this lottery by (a, pˆi). The second lottery is an objective lottery that pays out a
with probability r ∈ [0, 1], denoted by (a, r). The subject must select an r such that for
all values of r ≥ r she would prefer (a, r) to (a, pˆi).
The result in this experiment is that r changes with the value of a. In particular r is
increasing in a. This result is primarily driven in the condition when there was no prize
stake, i.e. P = 0. For completeness, the comparison is between the lottery (a,  · pˆi; 20, 1−)
versus the lottery (a,  · r; 20, 1− ).72 Again the puzzle is that r is increasing with a.
The interesting feature is that the loss function is symmetric, that is shifting r higher
results in the exact same expected loss as shifting r lower by the same amount. This means
that models of loss aversion, disappointment aversion, or regret would predict no change
in decision making as a is varied.73
72This notation (a,  · pˆi; 20, 1− ), refers to a reduced compound lottery that pays a with probability  · pˆi,
0 with probability  · (1− pˆi), and 20 with probability 1− .
73See models from Tversky et al. (1991), Gul (1991), and Loomes and Sugden (1982) respectively for
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On the other hand, certain classes of preferences that pertain to behavior under ambigu-
ity can potentially explain these patterns.74 In particular, if subjects’ degree of ambiguity
seeking is increasing in the financial stakes, then these preferences could generate the pat-
terns observed in the experimental data. This should not be too surprising, as the model
of BB axiomatized is analogous to the variational preferences model of Maccheroni et al.
(2006), with ambiguity seeking rather than ambiguity averse agents.
6 Conclusion
This experiment examined two models of optimistic belief formation, the optimal expec-
tations model of Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) (BP), and the affective decision making
model of Bracha and Brown (2012) (BB). Both models differ in how optimistic beliefs
are constrained, highlighting intuitive mechanisms: BP states that biased beliefs lead to
poor outcomes through sub-optimal decisions. A key feature of BB is that there are direct
mental costs of distorting reality.
The experiment exploits these differences and shows that optimistic beliefs are prevalent
across different domains. When individuals are given a large financial stake in an event, I
find evidence that bias increases, consistent with both models. However, larger incentive
payments for accurate reports leads to an increase in biased beliefs, a prediction made
uniquely by BB. The BP model makes the opposite prediction, which is rejected in the
data.
Additionally these results are consistent with the related work of Mayraz (2014), who
also found that higher accuracy payments led to a larger degree of bias.75 The present
experiment builds on this result, and shows that across a variety of events, with an incentive
compatible elicitation procedure, this result is a more robust phenomenon, and can be
explained in terms of the BB model.
The implications of these results are that direct costs of distorting beliefs matter for
their determination. Oster et al. (2013) have shown that optimism is likely an important
factor in understanding low rates of testing for Huntington Disease (HD). A question for
examples.
74Typically theoretical work seeks to model choices through the frame of ambiguity aversion or pessimism,
rather than optimism. An example is the model of Gumen et al. (2012).
75In Mayraz (2014) the predictions of BB are not unambiguous as in the present experiment, however
a positive association is not inconsistent with their model. The predictions of BP are rejected in Mayraz
(2014) as well.
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policy is how to increase testing rates for the disease. This experiment has shown that there
may be benefits to public health campaigns targeting at risk individuals, and educating
them on their true risk status. In contrast, as Oster et al. (2013) discuss, the BP model
provides only limited prescriptions for policy makers, such as drawing attention to how
behavioral changes may lower the expected costs of having HD.
One question is whether the results of this experiment will hold more generally when
the stakes are much higher, relative to those used in the lab. The costs of not being tested
for HD likely substantially exceed the stakes in the experiment. Further work might show
whether these results can be replicated for higher stakes.
The results also are highly relevant to work on belief elicitation in experiments. Slightly
counter-intuitively, the conclusion of this experiment shows that beliefs will be most accu-
rate precisely when incentives for accuracy are low. If incentives are too high, they may
detract from other components of the experiment, and the incentive payments themselves
may lead subjects to form biased beliefs.76
Finally this experiment contributes to empirical work that documents preferences over
ambiguity. The axiomatic characterization of the BB model provides a direct link to models
of ambiguity seeking behavior. It remains an open question to understand why preferences
appear ambiguity averse in some contexts, but ambiguity seeking in others. Empirical work
will be essential to answering this question.
Appendix
A Theoretical Extension: Allowing Subjects to Distort Other Probabil-
ities in the Model
In this section I relax the assumption that agents treat  and the distribution used to
determine the lottery method payout as given. Let ˆ be the biased probability that an
individual assigns to , and let Fˆ be the distorted distribution that the random number r
in the accuracy state is drawn from. The first step will be to show under what conditions
truthful reporting is still optimal. In this respect I will make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. For a BP agent ˆ ≥  > 0
76It is worth mentioning that there may be other reasons why higher incentive payments can be detri-
mental. Ga¨chter and Renner (2010) show that incentivizing beliefs can alter behavior in public goods
games.
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Assumption 2. For a BP agent Fˆ has full support on [0, 1], and for all r ∈ [0, 1], Fˆ (r) ≥
F (r), where F is a well-behaved CDF with full support on [0, 1] and r ≥ F (r) for all
r ∈ [0, 1]. Additionally the PDF of this distribution, f is non-decreasing on [0, 1].
These assumptions are to ensure that a BP agent never believes that possible states
of the world are impossible.77 In order to guarantee a solution exists I assume there is
some lower bound , which may in fact be extremely small, but non-zero.78 Similarly I
assume that there exists a bound on how skewed the distribution Fˆ can be, where F is
understood to be a highly right-skewed distribution that first order stochastically dominates
the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. These assumptions will not be required for a BB agent
since the mental cost function J∗(·) is such that the costs of holding such extreme beliefs
will ensure such beliefs are never optimal.
Proposition 2. Given Assumptions 1 and 2, an agent in the experiment truthfully reports
her belief, regardless of whether she holds BP, BB, or RE beliefs.
Proof. Here I refer to the proof of Proposition 1 for BB and RE agents. Consider only
BP agents. At this stage the individual takes ˆ and pˆi as given, and maximizes first period
utility. Assumption 1 guarantees that the report p˜i is relevant to the individual (if ˆ = 0
then the individual believes there is no chance of receiving payment for his report, and
hence is at liberty to report anything). Assumption 2 guarantees that the lottery method
is incentive compatible. With both these assumptions, the optimal report is p˜i = pˆi for a
BP agent.
Given that BB, BP, and RE agents all truthfully report their subjective beliefs, I now
turn to what optimal subjective beliefs pˆi and ˆ will be. This is separated into two sections,
first for BP agents followed by BB agents.
A.1 Optimal Beliefs in Brunnermeier and Parker (2005)
First note that the prize state strictly dominates the accuracy state, since the prize state
guarantees that wealth is at least a¯ regardless of whether E occurs or not, while in the
77Intuitively the reason for Assumption 1 is that if an individual were 100% certain that her probability
report in the experiment would not matter she no longer has any incentive to report truthfully. Similarly
for Assumption 2 if she believed that there were gaps in the support of the distribution of drawing a random
number r she would be indifferent between reporting any probability within such a gap.
78Such an assumption is plausible in light of evidence that individuals appear to treat near-zero and zero
probabilities as very different. Early evidence of this “certainty effect” can be found in the original Prospect
Theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
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accuracy state there is a probability of earning nothing, and the most the individual can
earn is a ≤ a¯. Thus according to Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) the optimal biased belief
for  would be to select a belief as low as possible. Because of Assumption 1, the optimal
belief will be ˆBP = .
Since r ∼ U [0, 1], the true probability that r < p˜i is p˜i and E[r|r > p˜i] = 1+p˜i2 . For a BP
agent believing that r ∼ Fˆ [0, 1] the probability r < p˜i = Fˆ (p˜i) and EFˆ [r|r > p˜i] =
∫ 1
p˜i rdFˆ (r)
1−Fˆ (p˜i) .
Consider two distributions with full support on [0, 1], Fˆ and Fˆ ′.
Proposition 3. If Fˆ first order stochastically dominates Fˆ ′, the BP agent weakly prefers
to believe Fˆ rather than Fˆ ′.
Proof. Given a BP agent truthfully reports his belief, the only relevance for this distribution
is the expected value of r whenever r > pˆi. Thus the agent prefers that the probability
(1 − Fˆ (pˆi)) ·
∫ 1
p˜i rdFˆ (r)
1−Fˆ (pˆi) =
∫ 1
p˜i rdFˆ (r) be as large as possible. Since first order stochastic
dominance ensures that
∫ 1
p˜i rdFˆ (r) ≥
∫ 1
p˜i rdFˆ
′(r) for any pˆi, the BP agent weakly prefers to
believe Fˆ .
Proposition 3 combined with Assumption 2 means that if the individual holds biased
beliefs about the distribution of r, she will select the optimal biased belief that r ∼ Fˆ = F .79
Thus optimal beliefs will be ˆBP =  and FˆBP = F , which critically, do not depend on the
belief about the event E occurring, pˆi. I now present the analog to Equations 8 and 9 in
the more general framework. Utility at time t = 1 is:
γ
[
 ·
(
F (p˜i) · (pˆi · u(a) + (1− pˆi) · u(0)) +(1− F (p˜i)) ·
(∫ 1
p˜i rdF (r)
1− F (p˜i) · u(a) + (1−
∫ 1
p˜i rdF (r)
1− F (p˜i) ) · u(0)
))
(15)
+(1− ) ·
(
pˆi · u(P + a¯) + (1− pˆi) · u(a¯)
)]
Utility at time t = 2 from second period consumption depends on the true probabilities
and distributions, which is unchanged hence I reproduce Equation 9:
79F also has the property that f is non-decreasing. Intuitively (and loosely speaking) a BP agent prefers
such distributions.
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 ·
(
p˜i · (pi · u(a) + (1− pi) · u(0)) + (1− p˜i) ·
(
1 + p˜i
2
· u(a)+
(1− 1 + p˜i
2
) · u(0)
))
+ (1− ) ·
(
pi · u(P + a¯) + (1− pi) · u(a¯)
)
As before I substitute p˜i = pˆi, substituting this value in, the optimal choice of pˆi is the
maximization of Equations (15) + 9, and is implicitly solved by:
γ · F (pˆiBP )− pˆiBP + pi+ (1− )γ · u(P + a¯)− u(a¯)
u(a)− u(0) = 0 (16)
As in Equation 10 a solution to the maximization problem exists, however the solution
may be at a corner. This includes the situation where γ = 1,  =  and F (pˆiBP ) = pˆiBP
which I ignore here since this situation was covered in the less general model. I now focus
on finding an interior solution. Note that there may be up to two interior solutions, however
the lower pˆiBP is the maximum.80
Next I show that the comparative statics are identical to the less general model. First
consider the derivative with respect to P :
dpˆiBP
dP
=
(1− )γ · u′(P+a¯)u(a)−u(0)
− γ · f(pˆiBP ) > 0 (18)
Next consider the derivative with respect to a:
dpˆiBP
da
= −
(1− )γ · u(P+a¯)−u(a¯)
(u(a)−u(0))2 u
′(a)
− γ · f(pˆiBP ) < 0 (19)
Where the denominator in both expressions is positive from the second order conditions
for a maximum. Thus, even when allowing a BP agent to distort the probability about
80The second order condition is:
γ · f(pˆiBP )−  (17)
f(0) = 0 and by Assumption 2 f is non-decreasing. Hence there is one inflection point, there are at most
two interior optima, the first of which is a maximum while the second is a minimum. If there is only one
interior optimum it will be a maximum.
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being in the accuracy or prize state () or to distort the distribution from which the lottery
method draws a random number from r ∼ F the comparative static results continue to
hold.
A.2 Optimal Beliefs in Bracha and Brown (2012)
First, I make an assumption regarding beliefs in Bracha and Brown (2012) regarding sep-
arability of the mental costs of distorting beliefs. Namely I assume that:
Assumption 3. If two events E1 and E2 are stochastically independent, then the mental
cost of distorting the probability of an outcome in E1, J
∗
E1
(·) is independent of the mental
cost of distorting the probability of an outcome in E2, J
∗
E2
(·). Moreover, I require that
changes in the event E1 do not affect the cost function J
∗
E2
(·), and vice-versa, so that the
mental cost functions are additively separable in the objective function of the emotional
process.
Recall again that J∗(xˆ, x) is strictly convex, which will ensure uniqueness. I now turn
to how a Bracha and Brown (2012) agent might behave if she also distorts her perception
of the distribution under which the lottery method operates, as well as the probability of
the accuracy state . In order to allow this I must make some restrictions in order to make
the theory tractable. In particular I assume that agents believe that r used in the lottery
method is drawn from a beta distribution, with parameters αˆ and β = 1. In this way,
αˆ = α = 1 corresponds to the uniform distribution, which is the “true” distribution used.
I assume the standard Bracha and Brown (2012) cost function, but a slightly different
interpretation. α is a parameter, not a probability, but this interpretation allows a reduced
form simplification that is tractable.
Specifically J∗α(αˆ, α) takes a minimum at αˆ = α = 1 and limαˆ→0 J∗α(αˆ, α) = limαˆ→K
J∗α(αˆ, α) =∞ for some K > 1. The only change in defining this function is that previously
K = 1 whereas now K > 1. The beta distribution is particularly intuitive for agents with
biased beliefs as the PDF of the beta distribution with β = 1 is monotonic. When good
outcomes are paid out from a lottery with probability r ∼ Beta(αˆ, 1), optimistic agents
prefer αˆ > 1, while pessimistic agents would prefer αˆ < 1.
The updated objective function of the emotional process (U) is (where the PDF of
Beta(αˆ, 1) is αˆxαˆ, and the CDF is xαˆ):
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max
pˆi,ˆ,αˆ
U (pˆi, ˆ, αˆ, P, a, a¯) = max
pˆi,ˆ,αˆ
{
ˆ · p˜iαˆ ·
(
pˆi · u(a)+ (1− pˆi) · u(0))+
(
1− p˜iαˆ
)
·
( αˆ
αˆ+1 ·
(
1− p˜iαˆ+1)
1− p˜iαˆ · u
(
a
)
+
(
1−
αˆ
αˆ+1 ·
(
1− p˜iαˆ+1)
1− p˜iαˆ
)
· u(0)
)]
+
(1− ˆ) ·
[
pˆi · u(P + a¯)+ (1− pˆi) · u(a¯)]− J∗pi(pˆi, pi)− J∗ (ˆ, )− J∗α (αˆ, α)}
Next I solve for the three FOCs and substitute in pˆi for p˜i. Thus these three first order
conditions hold with equality, and make up the equilibrium of the BB model.
First, the FOC for pˆi is:
ˆ · pˆiαˆ ·
(
u
(
a
)− u(0))+ (1− ˆ) · (u(P + a¯)− u(a¯))− J∗′pi (pˆi, pi) = 0
The FOC for ˆ is:
αˆ+ pˆiαˆ+1
1 + αˆ
·
(
u
(
a
)− u(0))+ u(0)− [pˆi · u(P + a¯)+ (1− pˆi) · u(a¯)]− J∗′ (ˆ, ) = 0
Finally the FOC for αˆ is:
ˆ ·
[(
1− pˆiαˆ+1
(1 + αˆ)2
+
log pˆi · pˆiαˆ+1
1 + αˆ
)
·
(
u
(
a
)− u(0))]− J∗′α (αˆ, α) = 0
Next, it will be useful for notation to use the following cross partial derivatives where
possible for the analysis:
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d2U
dpˆidˆ
=pˆiαˆ ·
(
u
(
a
)− u(0))− (u(P + a¯)− u(a¯))
d2U
dpˆidαˆ
=ˆ · log pˆi · pˆiαˆ ·
(
u
(
a
)− u(0)) < 0
d2U
dˆdαˆ
=
(
1− pˆiαˆ+1
(1 + αˆ)2
+
log pˆi · pˆiαˆ+1
1 + αˆ
)
·
(
u
(
a
)− u(0)) > 0
I next totally differentiate all three equations with respect to the accuracy payment a.
For notation, I denote Gpi as the equation from the FOC with respect to pˆi, and similarly
G and Gα for the other two. This differentiation gives:
dGpi
da
=ˆ · pˆiαˆ · u′(a)+ d2U
dpˆidαˆ
· dαˆ
da
+
d2U
dpˆidˆ
· dˆ
da
+
d2U
d2pˆi
· dpˆi
da
= 0
dG
da
=u′(a) ·
(
αˆ
αˆ+ 1
+
1
αˆ+ 1
pˆiαˆ+1
)
+
d2U
dˆdαˆ
· dαˆ
da
+
d2U
dpˆidˆ
· dpˆi
da
− J∗′′ ·
dˆ
da
= 0
dGα
da
=ˆ ·
(
1− pˆiαˆ+1
(1 + αˆ)2
+
log pˆi · pˆiαˆ+1
1 + αˆ
)
· u′(a)+ d2U
dˆdαˆ
· dˆ
da
+
d2U
dpˆidαˆ
· dpˆi
da
+
d2U
d2αˆ
· dαˆ
da
= 0
The solution to this system of equations gives the comparative static for dpˆi
BB
da :
dpˆiBB
da
= D−1pi ·
[
ˆ · pˆiαˆ · u′(x)+ d2U
dpˆidαˆ
·
ˆ ·
(
1−pˆiαˆ+1
(1+αˆ)2
+ log pˆi·pˆi
αˆ+1
1+αˆ
)
· u′(x)
−d2U
d2αˆ
+
( d2U
dpˆidαˆ · d
2U
dˆdαˆ
−d2U
d2αˆ
+
d2U
dpˆidˆ
)
·
u′(x) · pˆiαˆ+1 + d2Udˆdαˆ ·
ˆ·
(
1−pˆiαˆ+1
(1+αˆ)2
+ log pˆi·pˆi
αˆ+1
1+αˆ
)
·u′
(
x
)
− d2U
d2αˆ
J∗′′ − d2Udˆdαˆ
2 ·
(
− d2U
d2αˆ
)−1 ]
Where Dpi = −d2Ud2pˆi −
d2U
dpˆidαˆ
2
− d2U
d2αˆ
−
(
d2U
dpˆidαˆ
· d2U
dˆdαˆ
− d2U
d2αˆ
+ d
2U
dpˆidˆ
)2
·
(
J∗′′ − d
2U
dˆdαˆ
2 ·
(
− d2U
d2αˆ
)−1)−1
> 0.
The sign of the denominator follows from the second order conditions.
Letting κ =
1−pˆiαˆ+1
(1+αˆ)2
+ log pˆi·pˆi
αˆ+1
1+αˆ
− d2U
d2αˆ
,
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dpˆiBB
da
=
(
Dpi · u′(x)
)−1[
ˆ · pˆiαˆ + d
2U
dpˆidαˆ
· ˆ · κ+
d2U
dpˆidαˆ
· d2U
dˆdαˆ
− d2U
d2αˆ
+ d
2U
dpˆidˆ
J∗′′ − d2Udˆdαˆ
2 ·
(
− d2U
d2αˆ
)−1 · (pˆiαˆ+1 + d2Udˆdαˆ · ˆ · κ
)]
(20)
While this term is no longer unambiguously positive as in the main paper, I will make
an assumption that will restore this earlier result when P = 0. I assume:
Assumption 4. pˆi ≥ pi = 0.016 and J∗′′α > ˆ ·
(
u (a)− u (0) )
These assumptions are sufficient to guarantee that that secondary or higher order effects
do not override direct affects. Equation (20) contains a direct effect of increasing a (the
first term), as well as secondary effects (pˆi responds to optimal changes in α and ). The
first part of this assumption requires that the biased probability pˆi be not too small. 1.6% is
an upper bound on the restriction, assuming that all other choice probabilities ˆ and αˆ are
stacked against giving the comparative static result.81 In the context of the experiment,
this assumption is not restrictive at all. Only 24/1280 observations report a belief less than
1.6%. The second part of the assumption requires that the the mental cost function for
distorting α is suitably convex. In particular, the second derivative is assumed to be as
large as ˆ · (u(a)− u(0)).82 This condition is more likely to be satisfied when a is smaller.
Given Assumption 4, the comparative static result dpˆida > 0 continues to hold, even
permitting agents to distort the probability of  and the distribution used in the elicitation
procedure. Note again, that Assumption 4 is a sufficient but not necessary condition for
this result, and only guarantees this result when when P = 0.
Finally, I am similarly able to compute the second comparative static dpˆi
BB
dP .
dpˆiBB
dP
=
(
Dpi
)−1[
(1− ˆ) · u′(P + a¯)− pˆi · u′(P + a¯) · d
2U
dpˆidˆ +
d2U
dpˆidαˆ
· d2U
dˆdαˆ
− d2U
d2αˆ
J∗′′ − d2Udˆdαˆ
2 ·
(
− d2U
d2αˆ
)−1] (21)
811.6% was solved computationally, using numerical methods. Mathematically the reason for this lower
bound is because as pˆi → 0, log(pˆi)→ −∞, which amplifies second order effects.
82This condition is very similar to the automatically satisfied condition that J∗
′′
pi > ˆ ·
(
u (a)− u (0) ).
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Again, for the comparative static results in the main paper to continue to hold for this
extension it will be necessary to provide assumptions that will ensure that secondary effects
do not overrule direct effects. Here, when P = 80, it is likely that d
2U
dpˆidˆ < 0.
83 In this case
the final term multiplying −pˆi · u′(P + a¯) will be negative, making the entire second term
positive. As a result dpˆi
BB
dP > 0. In contrast, when P = 0, given Assumption 4, the final
term multiplying −pˆi · u′(P + a¯) will be positive. However, this term can also be shown to
be less than pˆi in absolute value. Thus one further condition is sufficient to always ensure
that this comparative static will be positive, namely that 1− ˆ ≥ pˆi2. Since ˆ ≤ 12 , because
individuals prefer the prize state, one can guarantee the result with:
Assumption 5. pˆi ≤ 0.707.
It is important to note that the size of the term multiplying −pˆi ·u′(P + a¯) is decreasing
in a, such that the comparative static is likely to hold for low values of a, but is less likely
to hold when a is large. This could potentially explain the negative coefficients of the
estimated data.
To summarize the theory in this section, when extending the models to allow individuals
to distort other probabilities, the results continue to go through under some assumptions.
For the BP model, the key assumption is that individuals must not believe that states
of the world are impossible. For BB the key assumptions provide sufficient conditions to
ensure that direct effects are not overturned by second or higher order effects. Regarding
the comparative static of dpˆi
BB
da > 0 it is likely to hold when P = 0, which matches the data.
For dpˆi
BB
dP > 0, this is likely to hold when a is low, which is precisely where the strongest
effect was found in the data. These theoretical predictions match the findings in the data,
and offer an alternative explanation of why some estimated coefficients are negative in the
results.
B Supplemental Tables
B.1 Summary Statistics
Table 5 describes summary statistics at the event level, comparing the No Stake versus $80
Stake condition, in order to check that the covariates are balanced across both treatments.
The table shows that there are no significant differences across any of the observed variables.
83If it is not negative, the rest of the paragraph explains the conditions necessary for it to be positive.
47
The table also details information about participants, approximately 41% of subjects are
male and 19% are economics or mathematics majors.
Table 5: Summary Statistics: Randomization of P ∈ {$0, $80}
$0 Stake $80 Stake Diff Total
Male 0.399 0.415 -0.016 0.407
Age 20.788 20.639 0.148 20.714
Test Score 3.931 3.704 0.227 3.821
Econ/Math Major 0.180 0.203 -0.023 0.192
Optimism Index 13.082 13.054 0.028 13.068
$100 gamble 0.696 0.713 -0.017 0.705
N 642 630 - 1272†
Difference is significant at * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01 using multiple sample test of means (allows heterogeneous
covariance). † N varies slightly by demographic variable.
Variable Descriptions: Test Score is absolute score on quiz (max score 10, minimum -5). Opti-
mism index from 0-16, higher indicates more optimistic on LOT-R style test. $100 Gamble indicates
preference for 50-50 chance at $100 over $20 with certainty.
Table 6 examines these same summary statistics grouped according to the accuracy
payments at the session level. Here the observation unit is the individual which accounts
for why the number of observations differs from the previous table. Note that the two
variables “Test Score” and “Optimism Index” could vary endogenously with the level of
accuracy incentives, as subjects may alter their effort on the test or change their reported
optimism level depending on the size of the accuracy payment. Nonetheless, there appears
to be no differences in any of these variables across the three accuracy payment treatments.
The final column tests for equality of means across all three accuracy payment groups.
None of the differences are significant at conventional levels. Overall the randomization
at the session level appears to have been successful, as the observed covariates appear
balanced across different sessions.
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Table 6: Summary Statistics: Randomization of Accuracy Payments
Accuracy: $3 $10 $20 All P-Value All
Male 0.467 0.354 0.394 0.407 0.258
Age 20.858 20.753 20.533 20.714 0.346
Test Score 3.538 3.966 3.962 3.821 0.402
Econ/Math Major 0.198 0.206 0.171 0.192 0.799
Optimism Index 13.217 12.639 13.314 13.068 0.269
$100 gamble 0.689 0.680 0.743 0.705 0.556
N† 106 107 105 318 -
Difference is significant at * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01. P-Value for multiple sample test of means (allows
heterogeneous covariance). † N varies slightly by demographic variable.
Variable Descriptions: Test Score is absolute score on quiz (max score 10, minimum -5). Opti-
mism index from 0-16, higher indicates more optimistic on LOT-R style test. $100 Gamble indicates
preference for 50-50 chance at $100 over $20 with certainty.
B.2 Hypothesis 2: Biased Priors Only
Here Table 7 examines Hypothesis 2 restricting the sample to only individuals who re-
ported upwardly biased probability reports.84 This examines the question of whether the
optimistic bias observed in Table 3 is partly accounted for by subjects becoming more
accurate. In fact, it can be seen that the results are very similar only looking at the biased
sample, indicating that the optimism bias is leading subjects to report probabilities even
further from the truth as accuracy payments increase.
84Specifically, observations at the individual-event level are included only if they reported probabilities
greater than the objective probabilities reported in Table 1.
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Table 7: Impact of Accuracy Payment on Beliefs (Testing Hypothesis 2)
All Events: Only individuals who reported biased priors
Regressor No Stake Stake = $80 All
Accuracy Payment (β2) 0.474 -0.038 0.215
(0.122)*** (0.162) (0.107)**
Easy Dice (γ2) 20.915 33.238 26.753
(1.965)*** (3.418)*** (2.001)***
Hard Dice (γ2) 26.021 31.216 28.622
(2.276)*** (2.825)*** (1.886)***
Weather (γ3) 60.476 66.925 63.792
(2.001)*** (2.337)*** (1.644)***
Quiz (Self) (γ4) 43.116 49.946 46.529
(4.804)*** (4.545)*** (3.320)***
Quiz (Other) (γ5) 23.387 31.301 27.558
(2.749)*** (3.268)*** (2.223)***
Score × Quiz (Self) (η) 1.427 1.084 1.288
(0.966) (0.815) (0.633)**
Session Fixed Effects NO NO NO
N 464 459 923
R2 0.472 0.394 0.425
Difference is significant at * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at individual level.
Constant omitted as
∑5
j=1Ej = 1. R
2 corrected for no-intercept. Sample restricted to include only
individual-event observations reporting optimistically biased priors.
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C P-Values Using Fisher’s Exact Test
In the primary analysis of Tables 2 and 3, the p-values resulting from standard errors
calculated using OLS may not be exact. Tests of normality on the residuals suggest that
they are not normally distributed (p-value 0.0000), an indication that OLS is no longer the
most efficient estimator, though it remains unbiased.
To address this issue, I use the permutation method introduced by Fisher (1936) to
calculate exact p-values. The intuition for this method (see Ernst (2004) for a discussion) is
relatively straightforward. The method suggests a hypothetical reassignment of the binary
treatment variable (here Pij), keeping the proportion treated constant. In theory, one
could calculate all of the permutations of the treatment, and look at the size of the average
treatment effect for each permutation. After completing this one can calculate how rare the
actual treatment effect is relative to the random reassignment procedure. The proportion
of hypothetical treatment effects using the permutation method that exceed the actual
treatment effect provides an exact p-value.
Because there were 1,280 individual-event observations, with 634 of those treated, the
number of permutations is very large: 1280!634!646! , a difficult task for the contemporary personal
computer. In practice, I used the computer to draw 1,000,000 permutations that assign at
random a treatment Pij such that the proportion of treated observations matches exactly
the proportion treated in the experiment.85
D Alternative Empirical Specification
A different empirical specification can be tested which examines the effects of both param-
eters, β1 and β2, as well as an interaction term β3:
p˜iij = β1 · 1{Pij > 0}+ β2 · a+ β3 · a · 1{Pij > 0}+
∑
1≤j≤5
γj · Ej + η · Si · E4 + ij . (22)
In theory, neither the BB or BP model provide unambiguous comparative statics for
β3. Table 8 presents results for the specification of Equation (22). The empirical results
are consistent with the previous discussion, with the coefficients on the Prize and Accu-
racy treatments being positive and significant. The interaction term, β3 is negative and
85As a result of computing constraints, for computing the permutations on the entire sample I used
800,000 permutations. For the five remaining sub-sample calculations I used 1,000,000 permutations.
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significant at the 5% level, which is not surprising given the earlier presentation of tests of
hypotheses 1 and 2 independently.
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Table 8: Interaction Between Stakes and Accuracy
All Events
Regressor All
Prize Payment (β1) 5.608
(2.327)**
Accuracy Payment (β2) 0.446
(0.116)***
Prize × Accuracy Interaction (β3) -0.393
(0.184)**
Easy Dice (γ1) 11.571
(1.560)***
Hard Dice (γ2) 15.253
(1.614)***
Weather (γ3) 57.671
(1.748)***
Quiz (Self) (γ4) 36.578
(3.362)***
Quiz (Other) (γ5) 21.100
(2.100)***
Score × Quiz (Self) (η) 2.124
(0.642)**
Session Fixed Effects NO
N 1280
R2 0.498
Difference is significant at * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at individual level.
Constant omitted as
∑5
j=1Ej = 1. R
2 corrected for no-intercept.
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E Effect of Control for Dice Events
Table 9 examines the same test of Hypothesis 1 in Table 2 Column 1 for the sample where
the accuracy payment is $3, but restricted only to the two events involving rolls of the dice.
One can see that, for the dice events, the positive effect of having an $80 stake is entirely
driven by individuals who have control over selecting numbers of their choice to come up
for the dice events.
Table 9: Examining the Illusion of Control
Dice Events Only. Accuracy Payment = $3
Regressor No Control Control
{P = $80} (β1) -0.977 8.435
(3.287) (3.811)**
Easy Dice (γ1) 16.232 17.729
(6.711)** (10.771)
Hard Dice (γ2) 16.751 19.358
(7.036)** (11.725)
Session Fixed Effects (α) YES YES
N 108 104
R2 0.076 0.197
Difference is significant at * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at individual level.
Constant omitted as
∑5
j=1Ej = 1. R
2 corrected for no-intercept.
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